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ABSTRACT
Although nation-based systems of financial regulation constitute a second-best approach to global
welfare maximization, treacherous accountability problems must be acknowledged and resolved
before regulatory cooperation can deal fairly and efficiently with cross-border issues. To track and
control insolvency risk within and across any set of countries, officials must construct a partnership
that  allows  regulators  in  every  participating  country  to  monitor  and  to  influence  counterpart
regulators in partnering nations. Using efforts to harmonize the Australian and New Zealand
regulatory systems as an example, this paper identifies characteristics by which regulatory systems
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CONFRONTING DIVERGENT INTERESTS IN CROSS-COUNTRY REGULATORY 
ARRANGEMENTS* 




  As financial institutions and markets more and more effectively transcend 
geographic borders, limitations of national systems of regulation become more 
consequential. Beginning with the five-page Basel Concordat of 1975, banking regulatory 
agencies in major countries have agreed that multinational banking organizations should 
be supervised in a cooperative manner by both their “home” and “host” countries.  The 
Concordat assigns home-country supervisors responsibility for consolidated oversight of 
global conglomerate banking organizations, while it leaves host-country regulators 
responsible both for supervising the local operations of foreign and domestic banks and 
for sharing relevant information about local operations with home-country regulators.  
The Concordat’s conflicting goals were to assure adequate cross-border supervision of 
multinational banks, while reducing the total regulatory burden generated across the 
jurisdictions in which the bank might operate and respecting a host country’s right to set 
its own domestic standards for individual-bank safety, system stability, and the 
accumulation of market power. 
  Under the aegis of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel 
Committee), the Concordat spurred a search for minimum prudential standards that 
evolved by 1997 into a 44-page statement of Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision.  These fluid principles are gradually congealing into amplifying criteria that 
teams of outside experts can use to make country-by-country assessments of regulatory 
effectiveness (Basel Committee, 2001).  In turn, these criteria are helping to shape a new 
and more-complicated system of risk-based capital requirements knows as “Basel II” 
(Basel Committee, 2003).  Basel II focuses the conflict between home and host regulators 
on how to verify and share information across countries and how to use whatever data 
they share to allocate a conglomerate institution’s capital and diversification benefits 
between local and home-country exposures to insolvency risk.  As in ordinary human 
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affairs, the need to mitigate or overcome bankers’ and foreign regulators’ incentives to 
hide embarrassing information is a central feature of conscientious bank supervision. 
  Although nation-based systems of financial regulation obviously constitute a 
second-best approach to global welfare maximization, treacherous accountability 
problems must be acknowledged and resolved before regulatory cooperation can deal 
fairly and efficiently with cross-border issues.  To track and control insolvency risk 
within and across any set of countries, officials must construct a partnership that allows 
regulators in every participating country to monitor and to influence counterpart 
regulators in all partnering nations.  Using efforts to partner the Australian and New 
Zealand regulatory systems as an example, this paper identifies characteristics by which 
regulatory systems differ and underscores particular features that make harmonization 
difficult to achieve.   
 
I. Trans-Tasman Regulatory Harmonization as an Illustrative Case 
 
  Troubled banks routinely conceal unfavorable information about their 
performance or condition from outsiders. Bank customers and counterparties acting on 
their own cannot easily uncover this information.  Partly to overcome this coordination 
problem, government chartering and supervision of banks and payments systems are 
near-universal phenomena.  Regulatory activities may be described as efforts by a trusted 
Third Party that affect the shaping, pricing, and delivery of banking products in one of 
three ways: by rule-making (e.g., capital requirements); by monitoring and enforcement; 
or by detecting and resolving insolvencies (i.e., shortages in bank-contributed net worth). 
  To the extent that the beneficiaries and the regulated are different parties, banking 
regulation is “other-regarding” and “other-directing.”  A principal goal is to protect 
society from the consequences of excessive risk-taking, capital shortages, and loss 
concealment at individual banks. To maximize global welfare, contracts under which 
officials are appointed would have to make them or their agencies explicitly accountable 
to potential loss-bearers in all partner countries for all costs incurred in preventing, 
detecting and resolving bank insolvencies.     December 2, 2005 
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The Basel Concordat and its later elaborations call for contact and cooperation 
between host and parent supervisory authorities.  In the absence of harmonizing contact 
and cooperation, contractual arrangements focus banking regulators in each country on 
domestic interests.  They would be expected to design and operate regulatory enterprises 
nationalistically, i.e., with an eye toward maximizing primarily the welfare of their own 
citizens. 
  It is important to recognize that policy coordination cannot eliminate cross-
country and within-country incentive conflicts in banking regulation.  At best, it may 
establish a contractable partnership that supplements—without substituting for—policies 
of sound regulatory discipline in individual countries.   
  Mishan (1969) emphasizes that economic policy performance should be assessed 
in two dimensions.  Optimal strategies produce outcomes that are simultaneously Pareto-
efficient and “distributionally preferred” (i.e., they help the representative citizen and 
avoid antiegalitarian effects on the distribution of income).
1  The Mishan criterion 
reminds us that cross-country arrangements to detect, prevent, and resolve bank 
insolvencies must not result in increased loss exposures that disadvantage the citizens of 
any partner country. 
  As stewards of taxpayer resources, the Mishan criterion implies that in each 
country financial supervisors and regulators owe four duties to the representative citizen:  
1. Vision (maintaining a capacity to recognize risk-taking and capital shortages in 
timely fashion); 
2. Prompt corrective action (being committed to control the value of implicit and 
explicit government guarantees); 
3. Least-cost resolution (efficiently curing insolvencies that corrective action fails 
to avert);  
4. Truth-telling (keeping voters and taxpayers informed about the true opportunity 
costs of regulatory strategies). 
                                                 
1 In the words of Andrew Jackson [quoted in Todd (2002)]: “In the full enjoyment of  . . . the fruits of 
superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by law; but when the 
laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions to grant titles , gratuities, 
and exclusive privileges to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of 
society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the time nor the means of securing like 
favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of government (1832).”     December 2, 2005 
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  Gaps in vision and reporting obligations engender incentive breakdowns.  They 
reduce society’s ability to hold regulators responsible for uncovering the truth about bank 
losses and acting on it.  This weakness in communicating societal disapproval 
undermines a regulator’s incentive to prevent insolvencies and to resolve them 
efficiently.  Being able to hide lapses in performance intensifies incentive conflict.  It 
makes it easier in tough times to pursue short-run political and career rewards that top 
officials can capture by not closely enforcing economic insolvency. 
  Sincere efforts to integrate the private banking markets of any two countries—in 
particular, those of Australia (A) and New Zealand (Z)—must also plan to integrate their 
private and governmental systems of information disclosure and banking regulation.  
Regulatory integration is complicated because, even if regulatory strategies and control 
structures (RA, RZ) did not differ greatly between the countries, individual-country 
regulators are responsible to different sets of taxpayers (TA, TZ) and social norms and 
applicable legislation makes private and governmental regulatory officials accountable to 
their citizens in disparate contractual ways (CA, CZ).  To maximize the joint welfare of 
citizens of both countries, it is not enough to blend the countries’ strategies and control 
structures.  To harmonize regulatory incentives, regulatory performance measures and 
reporting responsibilities must be refocused as well. 
  A country’s regulatory system co-evolves with popular perceptions of what 
regulatory problems cry out to be solved.  When citizens believe their country’s 
incentive-control system is working adequately, it is hard to build a coalition strong 
enough to win marked changes in regulatory strategies and tactics.  This is why 
substantial regulatory reforms usually occur only in the wake of large-scale crises. 
  In noncrisis times, lobbying activity can seldom achieve more than a marginal 
adjustment either in the objectives that officials pursue or in the tradeoffs officials make 
within the limits of their regulatory culture.  How particular policy strategies actually 
work in practice is co-determined by the rules officials adopt and by regulatees’ ability to 
find and exploit circumventive loopholes in the enforcement of these rules.  One reason 
that the issue of cross-border regulatory cooperation is on the table around the world is 
that exploiting loopholes often entails moving activities that one country might tax more 
heavily or regulate more effectively into the jurisdiction of another.     December 2, 2005 
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  With large Australian-owned institutions holding over 85 percent of the New 
Zealand banking market, harmonization is a hot-button issue in both countries.  Although 
the two countries agreed in early 2005 to establish a joint Trans-Tasman Council on 
Banking Supervision, the initial hopes and fears of officials in A and Z seemed to differ 
sharply.  Australian Treasurer Peter Costello portrayed harmonization as a process of 
negotiation in which a single system of “seamless” regulation would be the most 
desirable endpoint, while New Zealand Finance Minister Michael Cullen took care to 
label a single regulatory system as merely a “possible endpoint” (Joint Press Conference, 
Feb. 18, 2005). 
  New Zealand citizens could draw little comfort from a follow-up interview that 
Treasurer Costello offered in the February 19
th Weekend Herald.  He described his vision 
for the two countries as one in which “goods and services will move as seamlessly across 
the Tasman in much the same way they now move seamlessly across the Victorian and 
New South Wales border.” To the extent that states rights in Australia fall short of 
absolute sovereignty, this vision comes perilously close to expressing an intention to 
reduce New Zealand financially to Australia’s seventh state or third territory. 
  The over-riding task of financial regulation is to resolve diverse incentive 
conflicts in financial transactions at minimum net cost to society.  Treasurer Costello’s 
position assumes that dual supervision generates only “duplication and unnecessary 
cost.”  An alternative view is that, especially where bank risk exposures and capital 
positions are hard to detect and easy to shuffle across jurisdictions, two heads are likely 
to prove better than one.  This view is buttressed by the undeniable value to New Zealand 
citizens of ensuring that officials in any post-harmonization regulatory enterprise remain 
democratically accountable for identifying and protecting Kiwi interests and especially 
for preventing and managing the dangers and costs of future banking crises.  It is not for 
nothing that the New Testament warns of the impossibility of faithfully serving two 
masters. 
  Any system of government generates different costs and benefits for differently 
situated citizens and corporations.  It is natural for large Australian banks to ask their 
government to help them reduce their total taxes and regulatory compliance costs.  It is 
just as natural for New Zealand citizens to worry about how well their interests would be     December 2, 2005 
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represented in an evolving global banking system if their concerns had to be filtered 
through the economic interests of Australian banks and the political interests of 
Australian regulators.   
The Trans-Tasman Council’s central contracting problem is to recognize and 
ameliorate conflicts between societal and private interests that exist in Tasman-area 
markets for banking services. Woolford and Orr (2005, p. 46) define the Council’s main 
goal as promoting “maximum coordination, cooperation, and harmonisation of trans-
Tasman bank regulation where sensible.” To me, this means integrating one country’s 
regulatory system with that of the other country without eroding the advantages and 
democratic responsibilities of either. To accomplish this task, conferees must develop 
transparent measures of bank and regulatory performance and incorporate these measures 
into a self-enforcing contractual structure that empowers citizens of both countries to 
hold officials accountable for the tradeoffs they make between joint and national interests 
(Schüler, 2003). 
   
II. Primacy of Controlling Incentive Conflict 
 
  In banking, depositors and other outside stakeholders may be exposed to loss 
from fraud, leverage, or earnings volatility without being adequately informed or 
compensated for the risks entailed.  To reduce their exposure to these three types of risk 
shifting, a bank’s counterparties deploy three remedies: (1) they require the bank to bond 
itself in various ways to behave honestly and fairly; (2) they negotiate a deterrent right to 
punish opportunistic behavior; and (3) they monitor information on the bank’s ongoing 
performance and condition. 
  Bonding, policing, and monitoring are not costless.  The costs vary inversely with 
the transparency (T) provided by the accounting and disclosure regime under which the 
bank operates.  The more transparent the disclosure regime, the more easily and more 
accurately outsiders—depositors, investors, and supervisors—can estimate the true value 
of a bank’s assets and liabilities.  But policing costs are also a function of outside 
stakeholders’ ability to appreciate the implications of the information they receive (i.e.,     December 2, 2005 
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their financial expertise) and their ability to coordinate deterrent and punitive responses 
with others (i.e., their disciplinary power). 
  In the absence of credible third-party guarantees, financially sophisticated 
counterparties act as keynoters whose actions put strong pressure on banks known to be 
experiencing opportunity-cost losses to adjust their affairs promptly.  The market forces 
keynoters unleash require troubled banks to do one or all of three things: shrink their 
footings, raise more capital, or pay higher interest rates on their deposits and other debt. 
  In monitoring, disciplining, and resolving banks, the incentives of government 
officials to act promptly differ from the duties and incentives of private creditors in 
important ways.  Because official interventions are unusual and generate a great deal of 
publicity, officials cannot focus only on the economic costs and benefits of the 
intervention.  Given that disadvantaged parties would be all too ready to accuse them of 
creating or escalating problem situations, regulators must worry about the political and 
career ramifications of even the most-dutiful interventions.  Even small interventions can 
damage their professional reputations and careers if their policies distress powerful 
parties.  
  Although many commonalities of interest exist, governmental systems for setting 
and enforcing financial rules are infested with incentive conflict.  Even within a country, 
major conflicts exist between and among: 
1.  Regulators and the firms they regulate; 
2.  Particular regulators and other societal watchdogs; 
3.  Regulators and the politicians to whom they must report; 
4.  Taxpayers and the politicians and regulatory personnel they put in office. 
How a country traditionally approaches and resolves these conflicts is in part hard-wired 
into its political and institutional structure.  To different extents, societies impose bonds 
of community on individual citizens. Ideally, these bonds restrain corporate and 
governmental decision making in socially beneficial ways.  Communal bonds generate an 
internally and externally enforced sense of reciprocity that inserts into individual 
preference functions a concern for one another’s welfare that deters at least some forms 
of opportunistic behavior. To reinforce these implicit controls, a country also works out 
ways for watchdogs to fill gaps in the bonding, deterrent rights (deterrency), and     December 2, 2005 
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transparency inherent in its private contracting environment.  Over time, efforts to close 





III. Difficulty of Resolving Divergences in Regulatory Culture 
 
  When private corporations merge, the goal of the transaction is to create value by 
enhancing the capabilities and performance of partner firms.  To be successful, managers 
of the combined enterprise must identify synergies and mitigate conflicts of interest 
among various stakeholders.  Especially in cross-border combinations, empirical 
evidence indicates that marked differences in either the corporate cultures or strategic 
orientations of partnering firms reduce the chance that they can be merged successfully 
(Weston, Siu, and Johnson, 2001, p. 639); Altunbas and Ibáñez, 2004). 
  This section begins by defining a regulatory analogue to the concept of corporate 
culture.  This concept provides a systematic way to compare and contrast the specific 
regulatory strategies and tactics employed in Australia and New Zealand.  Despite a 
number of fundamental similarities, important differences in culture can be identified.  
From an evolutionary perspective, the very persistence of these differences indicates that, 
within each country, idiosyncratic features manage to resolve incentive conflicts with 
reasonable efficiency. The Trans-Tasman council cannot hope to build a system that 
stitches together in compromise fashion an equal number of pieces from the different 
regulatory systems without losing the threads of economic logic that underlie them. If 
these threads are not rewoven carefully enough, the citizens of one or both partner 
countries will suffer substantial welfare losses. 
 
The Concept of Regulatory Culture.   A culture may be defined as customs, ideas, and 
attitudes that members of a group share and transmit from generation to generation by 
systems of subtle and unsubtle rewards and punishments.  A regulatory culture is more 
than a system of rules and enforcement.  It incorporates higher-order norms about how     December 2, 2005 
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officials should comport themselves; these norms limit the ways in which uncooperative 
or even unscrupulous individual bankers can be monitored and disciplined.  It includes a 
matrix of attitudes and beliefs that define what it means for a regulator to use its 
investigative and disciplinary authority honorably.  These attitudes and beliefs set 
standards for the fair use of government power.  Checks and balances that bound each 
agency’s jurisdiction express a distrust of government power that often traces back to 
abuses observed in a distant past when the country was occupied, colonized, or run by a 
one-party government.  Underlying every formal regulatory structure is a set of higher-
order social norms that penetrate and shape the policy-making process and the political 
and legal environments within which intersectoral bargaining takes place.  These 
underlying standards, taboos, and traditions are normative in two senses.  They 
simultaneously define what behaviors are “normal” and what behaviors regulators should 
mimick to avoid criticism or shame. 
  Prudential regulation imposes on regulators a duty to stop excessive risk-taking 
and to find and resolve hidden individual-bank insolvencies in timely fashion.  Within 
any country, the Regulatory Culture within which this duty is discharged is spanned by 
six specific components: 
•  Legal authority and reporting obligations 
•  Formulation and promulgation of specific rules 
•  Technology of monitoring for violations & compliance 
•  Penalties for material violations 
•  The regulator’s duties of consultation:  To guarantee fairness, regulated parties 
have a  right to participation and due process, which imposes substantial burdens 
of proof on the regulator  
•  Regulatees’ rights to judicial review: Intervened parties have an access to appeals 
procedures that bond the fairness guarantee.   
 
Similarities in Australian and New Zealand Regulatory Cultures. 
  In Australia and New Zealand, the last three dimensions of regulatory culture are 
fundamentally the same.  Both countries accept social norms that subject official 
decisions to intragovernmental checks and balances and require them as well to treat     December 2, 2005 
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violators as innocent until formally proven guilty and to assure that punishments meted 
out do not exceed the social importance of the violations at issue.  The presumption of 
innocence protects fraudsters and bumblers from prompt regulatory discipline; the other 
two norms make it impossible to make penalties draconian enough to eliminate risk-
shifting incentives completely. 
  By increasing the difficulty of proving a bank to be insolvent, tests of regulatory 
authority, fairness, and reasonableness prolong the process of detecting and resolving 
insolvencies.  Even a deeply insolvent institution can delay and ameliorate disciplinary 
actions in two-ways: (1) by delaying writedowns of impaired assets, and (2) by 
accumulating political clout and using it to generate outside (and not always proper) 
interference on its behalf. 
   
Differences in the Allocation and Implementation of Legal Authority.  Despite sharing 
almost identical legal norms, the regulatory systems of the two countries differ 
importantly in each of the first three dimensions.  The Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(RBNZ) combines specialized prudential supervision of the NZ banking system with the 
tasks of conceiving and executing monetary-policy actions.  Conduct-of-business 
regulation and supervision of financial firms in nonbank sectors is conducted by other 
agencies.  In Australia, the relatively new Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA) follows the British model of leaving monetary policy to the central bank [The 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)], and exercises supervisory authority in an integrated 
manner over insurance companies, depository institutions, and some types of securities 
firms. 
  These different structures of prudential regulation allocate responsibility for 
preserving financial stability in very different ways.  Unlike APRA, the RBNZ at present 
has no formal responsibilities for supervising nonbank institutions (Mortlock, 2003).  
Unlike the RBNZ, APRA leaves policy decisions that affect interest-rate and exchange-
rate volatility to the RBA, even though monetary-policy decisions can work potentially 
devastating effects on an individual bank’s solvency and risk profile. 
  Several other ways of allocating legal authority for promoting financial stability 
are used by other countries.  For example, the U.S. central bank combines monetary-    December 2, 2005 
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policy authority with supervisory responsibilities, but competes for and shares 
supervisory jurisdiction over banks with many other regulators.  Several European 
countries task their central bank with supervising securities firms and banks in tandem. 
  The great diversity we observe in how supervisory authority is allocated supports 
this paper’s central hypothesis that different ways of dividing supervisory and monetary-
policy responsibility have particular advantages and disadvantages, with the balance of 
costs and benefits varying with the character of a country’s financial and political 
contracting environment.  Common sense and Samuelson’s principle of revealed 
preference tell us that each country’s current structure is better suited to its own particular 
financial environment than any other country’s would be. 
 
Interaction of Differences in Monitoring Methods, Rules, and Enforcement.  The goal of 
all systems for supervising banks is the same: to assure a safe and sound financial 
environment by protecting depositors and the economic health of the nation as a whole 
from hidden and disruptive bank risk-taking.  Ideally, rules and the ways they are 
enforced are designed to detect losses and imprudent risk exposures and to resolve capital 
shortages at banks before they can become deep enough to cause widespread disruption. 
  As explained earlier, authorities’ vision is constrained by leeway in accounting 
standards and by the larger disclosure regime in which their banks operate.  The rules and 
enforcement methods by which authorities pursue financial stability must be tailored to 
overcome weaknesses not only in their own vision, but also in the vision of partner 
regulators and in the bonding, deterrency, and transparency in their private contracting 
environments.   
  Disclosure regimes place a web of formal and informal obligations on bank 
managers, accountants, and directors.  These obligations determine what asset and 
liability items bank accountants must report values for, what changes in value must be 
reported (either on the balance sheet or in footnotes), and when and how authorities are to 
be informed about emerging losses. 
  In all countries, independent external accountants assume a responsibility for 
reporting accurate information to directors, creditors, stockholders, regulators, and other 
outsiders, even if the managers that hire them would prefer to cook the books in     December 2, 2005 
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misleading ways.  Similarly, bank directors have a duty to review and test audit reports 
for accuracy and to assure themselves and regulators that the bank is being managed well. 
  An effective regulatory partnership must impose sensible and enforceable 
regulator-to-regulator disclosure obligations all around. When top regulators receive 
strong evidence that crippling losses may be emerging at an individual bank, duty must 
also require them to dispatch a team of forensic analysts to measure the extent of these 
losses.  When the special exam is completed, regulators are expected to share the findings 
with the bank’s directors.  At this point, directors could request a brief window of time to 
give them a chance to cure the bank’s capital shortages.  If sufficient new capital is not 
subscribed, the bank would be closed, offered to a new owner, or placed in statutory 
management.  The task of statutory managers would be to decide afresh whether and 
when to liquidate the bank or offer it for sale. 
  In both Australia and New Zealand, auditors are required to report to the 
supervisory authority any evidence they uncover of actual or potential insolvency and to 
alert authorities about possible violations of prudential standards. Accountants must attest 
that nothing that “has come to their attention” in preparing or reviewing financial 
statements would cause them to believe that the bank’s financial statements and 
supplementary disclosures do not present a “true and fair view” of the matters to which 
they relate.  Section 96 of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act requires auditors to 
disclose directly to the RBNZ any information that is “likely to assist, or be relevant to 
the exercise by the bank of its powers under this part of this act” [i.e., the RBNZ’s 
supervisory powers].  The same section obliges a bank’s auditors to alert the RBNZ if 
they believe the bank is either “insolvent or is likely to become insolvent or is in serious 
financial difficulties.”  Section 97 requires auditors to “take reasonable steps to inform 
the registered bank” of their intention before expressing their concern to the RBNZ, and 
Section 98 protects auditors that make good-faith disclosures from civil and criminal 
liability or professional sanctions.  The legal force of these provisions is to assure that 
inserting exculpatory clauses into their articles of engagement cannot relieve auditors of 
legal liability for not reporting evidence of a developing bank insolvency.  The social 
force of these provisions comes from an individual’s desire to enjoy the esteem of his or     December 2, 2005 
    14 
her fellow citizens and to avoid disgrace. Experience suggests that most auditors are 
considerably more concerned about potential lawsuits than their social standing.   
  The most important difference in the supervisory regimes of Australia and New 
Zealand is the strength of the obligations that they place on bank directors to uncover and 
transmit unfavorable information to top regulators (Brash, 1996).  In Australia (indeed in 
most countries other than New Zealand), bank managers, auditors, and directors may (if 
they are careful about it) use loopholes in accounting rules to delay the transmission of 
adverse information to regulators.  Table 1 lists the alternative ways that news of 
crippling losses may first come to light.  It also lists the ways that managers, directors, 
and lower-level regulatory staff members may sugarcoat bad news or temporarily 
blockade the various paths through which bad news can reach top regulators. 
  For directors of registered banks, New Zealand’s disclosure regime imposes self-
reporting obligations that all but eliminate impunity for director-supported 
misrepresentation.  All directors must sign quarterly statements indicating whether “after 
due enquiry” they believe: (1) that the General Disclosure statement [Tripe (2001) 
describes the content of this document] contains all information required and is neither 
false nor misleading, (2) that the bank has complied with various regulations (including 
rules on lending to connected persons), and (3) that the bank has in place and is properly 
applying systems that adequately monitor and control material risks, a great many of 
which are named explicitly.  Finally, to do business in New Zealand, large Australian 
banks must be locally incorporated. While no explicit residential requirement yet exists, it 
has been understood that the chief executive should reside in New Zealand so that he or 
she could be prosecuted for false disclosures without extradition proceedings. 
  So far, directorial self-reporting has served New Zealand well.  The threat of legal 
and reputational penalties for false attestations have surfaced relevant supervisory issues 
both as a result of changes occurring at individual banks and as a result of changes made 
in the wording of RBNZ attestation requirements. Cautious directors of particular banks 
have on several occasions scheduled meetings with RBNZ senior staff to inform them 
promptly of concerns that interfere with their signing the required statements. Similarly, 
when the RBNZ has encountered inconsistencies in attestations and reports, RBNZ staff 
have initiated the same sort of meetings.      December 2, 2005 
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  This special channel of verification focuses rule-making on what positions or 
facts should be disclosed to the RBNZ and how the accuracy of disclosures should be 
certified.  Except for a web of specific restrictions on insurance activities and loans to 
connected firms and persons, the RBNZ eschews formal limits on the size of particular 
bank positions.  It presumes that directorial disclosure obligations will identify losses and 
imprudent loss exposures in a more relevant and more timely manner than a rigid 
program of position caps and periodic inspections for breaches by government examiners 
could. 
  In contrast, position caps and confidential government inspections play starring 
roles in Australia’s supervision of banks. Of course, the effectiveness of either regulatory 
regime is routinely undermined by regulation-induced innovation. Still, government 
supervisors are never going to know enough about the motives for financial innovation to 
design ratios that can serve as an effective first line of defense against risk-shifting by 
troubled banks.  The presumption that particular portfolio positions are either 
prohibitively risky in themselves or signify failure-producing risk-taking ignores both the 
value that any risky position may have in diversifying other risks and the rich and 
growing menu of techniques that banks use to hedge or intensify broad categories of risk-
taking today.  The pace of innovation in techniques of risk-taking and risk management 
virtually guarantees that with every passing day, balance-sheet ratios that predicted 
failure in the past become less and less reliable measures of a modern bank’s proneness 
to failure.  Both in rule-making and in monitoring, the continuing expansion and growing 
complication of structured and index derivatives keep government supervisors’ risk-
assessment capabilities lagging behind those of the banks they regulate. However, 
impairments to regulatory vision and verification are less daunting in that many of them 
can be contracted away.   
 
Summary.  In Australia and indeed in most other countries, inspection-based supervision 
is a game of hide the cheese.  The cheese, of course, is adverse information about a 
bank’s true condition or periodic performance.  Loopholes in the rules of the game 
incentivize bank directors to help managers to mislead supervisors and other outsiders.  
They can do this with impunity as long as the firm makes skillful and legitimate use of an     December 2, 2005 
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evolving set of professionally certified accounting loopholes.  Like night-club illusionists, 
managers and accountants may even expect ethically challenged directors to admire their 
proficiency in using smoke and mirrors to make losses and loss exposures invisible to the 
naked eye. 
  The distinctive feature of New Zealand’s post-1996 regulatory culture is that self-
reporting obligations imposed on directors simplify the supervisory burden of uncovering 
and proving fraud and insolvency.  It makes it illegal and disreputable for individual bank 
directors to assist others in perpetrating an illusion.  Directors are required by law to 
bring to the attention of the supervisor important adverse information they happen to 
come across.  This duty is enforced by substantial criminal and civil penalties and 
intensified by the reputational harm that timely public exposure of formally illicit 
behavior inevitably brings. 
  Even with substantial prior notice, replacing either country’s regulatory system by 
the other would be extremely disruptive for the country whose supervisory traditions 
would be pushed aside.  It seems more sensible to focus on finding ways to network the 
two systems in a cooperative way and to explore experimentally which particular 
strategies and tactics can provide enough vision to control economic and financial stress 
within and across the partner countries. 
 
IV. The Role of Regulatory Culture in the Insolvency Detection and Bank Failure Process 
 
  Economists define economic net worth (NE) as the full-information value of a 
firm’s tangible and intangible assets and liabilities.  In statistical terms, accounting or 
book-value net worth (NBV) becomes a poorer and poorer estimator of NE.  As the latent 
variable NE declines, the estimator NBV becomes increasingly more biased and 
inefficient. 
  In effect, regulatory vision falters when it is most needed. This makes accounting 
insolvency a dangerously unreliable threshold for winding up the affairs of a troubled 
bank.  Opportunities to defer the accounting realization of economic losses render 
accounting net worth a lagging indicator of the extent of a troubled bank’s capital 
shortage.  When a financial institution’s survival is threatened, adverse information     December 2, 2005 
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becomes harder and harder to detect in accounting reports.  The threshold at which 
authorities can force stockholders to either recapitalize a troubled bank or surrender their 
franchise must be set high enough to compensate for this predictable decline in acuity.   
  Historical experience shows that, with a zero NBV threshold, financial institutions’ 
ability to conceal risky transactions and impairments in asset values from outside eyes 
can allow economic insolvencies to reach costly depths before authorities can address 
them (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003).  Weaknesses in loss detection and regulatory 
intervention rights can spawn a systemic crisis by enabling insolvent institutions to adopt 
aggressive risk-taking strategies that—by destroying profit margins—spread insolvency 
to competing institutions. 
 
Crisis-Driven Reforms in New Zealand and the United States  According to Honohan and 
Klingebiel (2003), New Zealand’s banking system was in crisis between 1989 and 1992 
(see also Ledingham, 1995).  Several foreign-owned banks had to be recapitalized by 
their parents, but a number of financial firms failed, one of which was a major institution: 
the Development Finance Corporation (in 1989).  Although DFC was not a commercial 
bank, it was the seventh-largest financial institution in New Zealand.  As the first 
important financial insolvency to occur in many years, the need to resolve its affairs was 
a systemic event that disrupted credit flows and put the viability of a few other 
institutions into question.  Winding up its affairs took many years and absorbed a great 
deal of supervisory resources. 
  According to Brash (2000), the country’s largest bank [the Bank of New Zealand] 
would almost certainly have failed as well if the government (as the majority shareholder 
at the time) had not been willing on two occasions to provide a “capital injection.”  The 
size of the second (1990) injection was disclosed to be NZ$620 million.  Honohan and 
Klingebiel estimate that the total fiscal cost of the crisis was 1.0 percent of GDP.  
Although this cost is comparatively low, in dollar terms it is substantial. The policy 
lessons revealed by this turbulent episode prompted authorities to redesign the RBNZ’s 
early warning system to emphasize self-reporting by directors. 
  Australia experienced a crisis of similar magnitude. Although it also did not offer 
explicit deposit insurance, its winding-up regime gave depositors preference over other     December 2, 2005 
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creditors (a feature enacted in 1959). Authorities made minor changes in the substance of 
its disclosure, intervention, and detection regimes. Without triggering a whistleblowing 
obligation, directors of a distressed Australian bank can still stand by while managers 
search out and exploit loopholes that can conceal losses.  Governmental intervention 
rights continue to depend primarily on examiners’ ability to uncover and verify hidden 
problems.  However, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) imposes disclosure and 
whistle-blowing obligations on listed banks. These obligations fall on the banking 
“entity” rather than specific officeholders and shift the burden of further disclosure onto 
the ASX
2. This leaves the forensic accounting burden that supervisory officials must 
meet before they can intervene somewhat higher in Australia than in New Zealand and 
more subjective than in the U.S. 
  Although the U.S. operates an insolvency-detection regime similar to Australia’s, 
taxpayer losses in the savings-and-loan debacle led Congress to beef up and mechanize 
regulators’ intervention and winding-up rights.  Along a specified ladder of positive net-
worth thresholds, U.S. banking law now authorizes an escalating series of interventions 
and requires regulators to intervene ever more strongly as a bank’s accounting net-worth 
declines.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 instructs 
bank regulators to demand that banks take particularly strong corrective actions whenever 
their book-value net worth falls below 4 percent of assets.  If these remedies fail to stop 
the slide in a bank’s accounting net worth, regulators must order a stockholder 
recapitalization.  If the recapitalization does not materialize or proves insufficient, 
authorities must—after due notice—put the bank into a receivership or conservatorship 
(in most circumstances) once its book-value net worth falls below 2 percent of assets.  
Putting stockholders on notice lets them avoid closure by injecting new capital or finding 
a merger partner.  They should exercise one of these options if they believe that NE is still 
positive.  The alternatives that these options offer prevent the 2-percent threshold from 
being characterized under common law as an “unjust taking” of private assets by the 
government. 
                                                 
2 ASX Listing Rule 3.1 states: “Once an entity is or becomes aware of any information concerning it that 
any reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of an entity’s securities, 
the entity must immediately tell ASX that information.”     December 2, 2005 
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  APRA employs triggers for intervention as well. The process is called 
PAIRS/SOARS. Experts evaluate the financial health of a bank and its systemic 
significance. This evaluation feeds into a four-way classification scheme for calibrating 
the need for regulatory attention and discipline: normal; oversight; mandated 
improvement; restructuring. Quantitative elements in these assessments influence but do 
not formally dictate APRA’s response.  
 
Potential Conflict between the Australian and New Zealand Strategies for Insolvency-
Detection  The success of any partnership depends on how much the partners disagree 
and how well they can handle disagreement.  Potential conflict between host-country and 
home-country supervisors intensifies as a bank weakens.  Divergences in disclosure and 
detection regimes allow home and host regulators to compile and react to evidence of 
bank weakness in different ways. 
  Mayes (2005) distinguishes four regimes of market and supervisory response to 
individual-bank accounting reports.  In the first regime, market participants and 
supervisors are satisfied with the bank’s condition and performance and impose no 
penalties.  In the second regime, the bank manages to meet all supervisory tests, but 
market participants begin to impose risk premiums.  In the third case, supervisors begin 
to be concerned and should be acting to strengthen the bank.  In the fourth case, the bank 
is economically insolvent and authorities need to take over the bank and relicense it. 
  Within Mayes’ third regime, home and host supervisors may not be equally 
concerned. Even when both sets of regulators enjoy the same acuity of vision, 
nationalistic norms and reputational concern might tempt home-country officials to delay 
insolvency resolution (Kane, 1989).  Home-country delays give managers of a failing 
institution an opportunity to shift bad assets to the host jurisdiction.  When banking 
problems surface during a top official’s watch, his or her reputation is at risk.  In some 
cases, agency leaders may even be grateful that accounting trickery can temporarily hide 
evidence of weakness from the market. Similarly, in the host country, effective action 
may also be delayed by the threat of career and reputational penalties that politically 
important foreign banks may be able to exert on particular ministers both directly and 
through the press.         December 2, 2005 
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As the home-country regulator, it is APRA’s job to assess the strength of each 
cross-country conglomerate institution. Although rumors can speed up the process, 
Australia maintains a traditional zero-value accounting threshold for failing a bank or 
banking conglomerate.  It is easy to imagine circumstances in which information 
transmitted by resident directors would lead the RBNZ to recognize the insolvency of an 
Australian bank’s New Zealand subsidiary long before periodic reports and APRA’s 
examination-based verification methods could ascertain whether the economic net worth 
of the Australian parent was truly strong enough to cover New Zealand losses on a 
consolidated basis.   
These are precisely the circumstances in which preserving RBNZ intervention 
rights would protect New Zealand taxpayers from potential weaknesses or mistakes in 
Australian supervision. In cases where the conglomerate organization was in fact weak,  
home-country managers would not want the RBNZ to force APRA to examine their 
accounts more closely.  Given the RBNZ policy of local incorporation, a supervisorily 
compliant, but economically insolvent Australian parent would recognize the value of 
making sure that, at each quarterly reporting date, it had shuffled enough good assets to 
its New Zealand subsidiary to keep local accountants and directors from blowing any 
whistles.  Backed up by local directors’ obligation to inform the RBNZ of any transaction 
than weakens a New Zealand institution, this incentive protects New Zealand taxpayers 
from being saddled with losses incurred in Australia.  However, this protection would 
unravel either if Australian banks were allowed to operate in New Zealand through 
branch offices or if the Australian scheme for insolvency detection were simply to 




  Prudential regulation seeks to assure the safety and soundness of the financial 
sector.  As institutions and markets evolve, so must processes for resolving incentive 
conflicts in financial transactions. 
  The inherited regulatory cultures of Australia and New Zealand show differences 
in the structure of legal authority, in their reliance on position limits and other rules, and     December 2, 2005 
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in the technology used to monitor bank risk-taking and net worth.  Lasting differences in 
regulatory culture evolve experimentally, as tentative solutions to recognized societal 
problems that prove themselves able to meet the test of time. 
  The persistence of substantial differences implies that authorities in the two 
countries have had to respond to fundamental differences in operative political, cultural, 
and risk-taking environments.  Replacing New Zealand’s financial regulatory system 
with that of Australia would simultaneously deny New Zealand citizens the hard-won 
benefits of this evolutionary process and make it hard for them to hold regulatory 
officials in Australia accountable politically for costs their policy decisions might impose 
on the Kiwi economy.   
The Mishan welfare criterion tells us that trans-Tasman regulatory arrangements 
cannot be fairly harmonized unless and until political mechanisms can be established that 
enable regulators and citizens of both countries to observe and adequately discipline the 
tradeoffs that responsible officials make between their own and partner-country interests 
when these interests diverge.  Only by crafting the equivalent of a strong and fair 
prenuptial agreement can efforts to marry the regulation of individual-country banking 
markets be expected to succeed. At a minimum, each prenuptial agreement must impose 
bilateral obligations to intervene well in advance of book-value insolvency and to 
disclose emerging concerns to partner regulators promptly. To back up these obligations, 
the agreement should authorize partner regulators to sue in a neutral court to recover 
damages from countries whose officials appear to have violated this right.       December 2, 2005 
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TABLE 1 
PATHS BY WHICH BAD NEWS MAY REACH TOP REGULATORS 
 
 
Ways in Which 
Crippling News 
Surfaces 
Initial Source of 
Corrective 
Pressure 
Ways in Which 
Bank Management 
Can Challenge or 
Stifle Bad News 
Ways in Which 
Regulators Can 
Lessen the Call to 
Action Generated 





irregularities in loan 
underwriting, 
documentation, or 
loss reserves during 
an ordinary bank 
examination 











provides evidence to 
either:  
a.  the bank’s 
external auditor 
b.  the bank’s board 
of directors 
c.  regulatory 
staffmembers. 






may be persuaded 
to ignore the 
evidence 




a.  Not applicable 
b.  Not applicable 









either quits, is fired, 
or issues a qualified 
report 
Managers concoct a 
persuasive cover 
story for the 
impasse. 
Regulators may 
ignore the audit 
impasse 
4.  Creditor-Driven 
Path 
News about auditor 
issues, leaks, or 
autonomous rumors 
undermine depositor 






pay very high 
interest on large 
deposits or 
interbank loans 
Central bank may 
replace private 
funding with 
discount-window 
loans 
 